In this paper we give a new presentation of ELF which is well-suited for semantic analysis. We introduce the notions of internal codability, internal de nability, internal typed calculi and frame languages. These notions are central to our perspective of logical frameworks. We will argue that a logical framework is a typed calculus which formalizes the relationship between internal typed languages and frame languages. In the second half of the paper, we demonstrate the advantage of our logical framework by showing some categorical properties of it and of encodings in it. By doing so we hope to indicate a sensible model theory of encodings.
Introduction
The notion of logical frameworks rst appeared in Martin-L of's work ( NPS90] ). It was meant to be a simple language with which his set theory can be precisely de ned. The idea is picked up and extended in HHP87, HHP92] . According to the authors, logical frameworks are languages in which logics can be adequately de ned. The good properties of the meta-languages then guarantee that all manipulations of the de ned logics are correct and easy (or even decidable). The language in HHP87, HHP92], now known as ELF, consists of kinds, constructors and objects. Types are constructors of kind Type. In addition to the usual type theoretical features, it has signatures which declare constant terms. In other words, signatures are constant contexts except that one can de ne constant constructors in a signature. When coding up an object language, one rst de nes an appropriate signature so that logical operators become constant objects or constructors. An important feature about ELF is that rules in object languages are presented as objects in the framework. Derivations then amount to function applications. To guarantee the correctness of the encoding, an adequacy theorem must be proved each time a logic is de ned in the framework. The adequacy theorem basically says that what has been formulated in ELF is sound and faithful with respect to the object language of interest.
A prominent question a designer of a logical framework must address is this: How are the variables in an object language represented in the framework? ELF's answer is to identify the variables in an object language with those of the framework itself. Leaving the philosophical consequence of this attitude aside, such a convention works most of the time. Here are some other arguments for the convention: (i) The only binding operation in a logical framework is required to code various bindings in many di erent logics; (ii) There doesn't seem to be any other way. One important observation in this paper is that this variable-identi cation has serious impact on model theory.
A selling point of ELF, and logical frameworks in general, is that non-constructive logics can also be treated. The point is that whatever the object logic is, be it classical or intuitionistic, any assertion that holds in the logic must be constructively veri able. In the light of type theory, an assertion forms a range of signi cance. So it can be represented as a type and its inhabitants are its veri ers. This is the so-called \judgement-as-type" principle.
The core of Martin-L of's logical framework and that of ELF are the same. But their emphasis is di erent. Martin-L of sees his logical framework as a foundational language upon which his constructive set theory is built. For that to be possible, he needs to talk about de nitional equality for the object languages. His solution is to use equational theories of his framework. So to be precise, Martin-L of's monomorphic set theories are equational theories in the underlying calculus. On the other hand, the motivation in HHP87, HHP92] is to design a meta-language once and for all, so that logics can be represented and proof-checking be mechanized. To keep the calculus decidable, one has to settle for the internal representation of the de nitional equality in object languages. Now =, like 2, plays a special role in proof theory. But ELF treats x = y as a judgement just like other judgements. This is a price one has to pay to retain decidability.
The belief that the legitimacy of a proof should be e ectively recognizable leads to the principle that languages supporting proof-checking should be decidable. Apart from ELF, this property holds of several other systems. The historically rst among them is de Bruijn's Automath family ( dB80] ) whose main goal is to carry out some mathematical arguments on computers. The intensional set theory of Martin-L of ( NPS90] ) is also decidable. Its grand purpose is to provide a new foundation for constructive mathematics. The construction-like calculi ( CH88, Luo90, Luo91] ) are the blend of F ! and constructive set theory. They are perhaps the strongest logical systems we can ever have. Other type theories have too sophisticated type constructors to be decidable. One example is the NuPRL system ( ea86] ). The logical theory of constructions described in MA88] has altogether a di erent avour. Most of the languages we just mentioned do not purport to be logical frameworks.
Analogous to the compile/run-time dichotomy in functional programming languages viewed as indexed categories ( Mog89, HMM90, Mog91]), the relationship between the meta-language and object languages is similar. Our view of what constitute a model for an encoding in a logical framework will make the comparison clearer. On one hand, the meta-theory of the framework should be well understood. On the other hand, the need for good properties of an object language depends on a speci c application we have in mind. At another level, the formulated object calculi are compile-time objects; their well-formedness must be checked by machine before they are used and it is done once for all. The run-time objects are the terms constructed in terms of the formulated language.
Another advantage in insisting on such a dichotomy is shown in Luo92]. There the author takes the view that, as far as programmes are concerned, the natural notion for computational equality is the intensional one. But when reasoning about programs, say in a correctness proof, we would very much like the extensional equality to hold logically. This can be achieved only if the logical framework is extensional (externally). Extensionality is essential for concise representations of object languages; it also simpli es proofs of adequacy theorem. In this paper we insist that all logical frameworks should be extensional.
The proof theoretical and pragmatical aspects of logical frameworks have been extensively studied ( HP91, HPJ91] ). The model theory of them however has not yet been paid enough attention it deserves. This paper sets out to remedy this. But rst, we need to make clear what we mean by a logical framework in this work. A logical framework is a typed calculus upon (or in) which typed calculi are de ned. Putting di erently, the theory of logical frameworks is about internal type theory. This uni es the views taken in HHP87, HHP92] and NPS90] and, arguably, also covers other more complex languages. The various well-known coding techniques ( BB85, Wra89]) belong to internal type theory. As a matter of fact, one uses one or more of them whenever one designs a language in a logical framework. This de nition is semantically motivated. What internal categories to an ambient category, object languages are to a logical framework.
In this paper we introduce the notions of internal de nability, internal codability, internal typed calculi and frame languages. An example is given to show the potential usefulness of this de nition. We propose an alternative presentation of Edinburgh LF based on the idea of internal typed calculi and frame languages. The system is analyzed in terms of internal codability and de nability. We show that the new presentation makes it convenient for an algebraic investigation. We use three examples to illustrate some new observations about logical frameworks. Category theory is used to relate the model theory of the logical framework to those of the represented languages. Section 2 xes some notation that will be employed later. Section 3 gives the de nitions central to later development. Section 4 is an undemanding introduction to our logical framework TT . Some sample encodings are given in section 5. Section 6 details the fact that TT has built-in mechanism to generate internal full subcategories, whose relationship with the variable convention is shown next. Section 8 and 9 reveals some further categorical properties of TT . Section 10 outlines the idea of model theory for encodings.
Preliminaries
The technical de nitions given in this section are necessary to describe the categorical properties of TT ( Ehr88] ) is given by three functors p; G : F ?! B and I : B ?! F such that (i) p a I a G; (ii) the counit of the rst adjunction (and therefore the unit of the second adjunction) is an iso (i.e. I is full and faithful) and (iii) p is a bration. We say that the D-category is split if p is split.
An internal category C in B consists of objects C 0 , C 1 , C 2 and morphisms as shown in the diagram below It is possible to extend the above de nition to higher order cases. But in this paper de nition 3.1 su ces for our purpose.
Internal Codability in System F
This section takes a look at an example. We shall make a few observations about the family of system F in the perspective of de nition 3.1. In order to avoid the messy syntactical account, we shall give a model-theoretic presentation. The notation to be introduced below are borrowed from Pit87]. The results in this section also relies heavily on those in loc.cit.. We can not a ord a complete account as it will occupy too much space and distract our attention from the main subject.
Let F 0 denote the simply typed -calculus, F 1 the simply typed -calculus with free type variables, F 2 the second order polymorphism, F ! the higher order polymorphism, and F i the i-th order polymorphism. Each F i is required to have nite product types. A term model of F i is an indexed category P i : C op i ?!Ccc such that Ccc is the category of small cartesian closed categories.
Substitution functors preserve cartesian closed structures on the nose. fC i g i ! can be classi ed into three groups: { C 0 is the terminal category ?. { C 1 has nite products such that every object of it is U n , a product, for some n 2 !. { For i > 1, C i has nite products and exponentials whose order degree is less than i. Here is the de nition of the order degree, Od(X), of an object X: (i) the order degree of the terminal object is 0; (ii) Od(U) = 1; (iii) Od(W ! V ) = 1+maxfOd(W); Od(V )g if both Od(W) and Od(V ) are de ned; (iv) the order degree of any other object is unde ned. C i must also satisfy the following condition: every object of C i is a nite product each of its components has an order degree. If i > 1, then for any two objects X and I in C such that X has an order degree, there exists a functor I : P i (I X)?!P i (I) right adjoint to the weakening functor 
ev is the internal composition: The reader is referred to Pit87] for a proof.
Theorem 3.3 Suppose that for 0 i < j !, F i and F j have the same constant types and objects. Then (i) for any 0 i < j !, F i J F j ; (ii) F ! J F ! .
We rst mention two technical lemmas, whose proofs can be read o from Pit87]. Proof of theorem 3.3 (sketch) In the following diagram, the right square is a pullback by lemma 3.5. The left square commutes by assumption. By the conservativity of F i+1 over F i , the embedding F i , ! F i+1 is full and preserves all the relevant structures. So the composite F i , ! F i+1 ! D i+1 ] preserves all the structures and right adjoints (dom D i+1 has just enough right adjoints to be a model of F i ). So F i J F i+1 .
Notice that the left square is not a pullback. For instance, 8X:X] ] is an object over 1 2 C 2 but not an object over 1 2 C 1 .
As can be seen from the above proof, the main proof-theoretical fact that underlies theorem 3.3 is the conservativity of F i+1 over F i under the condition stated in the theorem.
Introducing TT
The purpose of the rst two subsections is to refresh our memory on ELF and Martin-L of's logical framework. In order to compare our logical framework to these two languages, we will give a complete presentation of each of the languages. It is our hope that by analysing all the three calculi at an elementary level, we can bring out the point and the advantage of TT . Having reviewed the two languages, we will then introduce our logical framework TT .
Martin-L of's Logical Framework
There are two ways of presenting Martin-L of's type theory. One approach is to de ne the type theory in a classical logic. Typed calculi so de ned are polymorphic in the sense that type constructors in them are not fully speci ed. For instance in x:A:b, b could be of any type. The other approach is to de ne the type theory in Martin-L of's logical framework. In contrast to the polymorphic case, terms in languages de ned in Martin-L of's logical framework are fully speci ed; these languages are therefore called monomorphic. To some extent the monomorphic Martin-L of's type theory is guaranteed to be well-behaved. A well-known fact is that the`extensional identity types' are not de nable in monomorphic type theory. We should point out that these remarks apply to logical frameworks in general.
Martin-L of's logical framework has following rules with the de nitional equality being extensional: Using this framework, the -types in Martin-L of's monomorphic type theory can be de ned as follows:
Context
: (X:Set)(Y :(x:El(X))Set)Set : (X:Set)(Y :(x:El(X))Set)(f:(x:El(X))El(Y (x)))El( (X; Y )) : (X:Set)(Y :(x:El(X))Set)(f:El( (X; Y )))(x:El(X))El(Y (x)):
The computational rule can be described as (A; B; (A; B; f); a) = f(a) : El(B(a)):
We nish this section by pointing out an important feature of Martin-L of's framework:
In Martin-L of's logical framework, the de nitional equalities of type theories (object languages) are identi ed with the de nitional equality of the framework.
We will call this the equality convention.
The Edinburgh LF
ELF is based on the idea of Martin-L of's logical framework. Its purpose is to code up a whole range of typed languages instead of just one group of them as in the case of Martin-L of's framework. The system is structured into three levels: objects, (families of) types and kinds. The top level kinds provide the mechanism to introduce di erent universes. In any particular application, a xed number of constants are introduced; they form a signature. These are the rules of ELF. We should remark that in ELF equalities in object languages are`internalized' by appropriate families of types. Following Martin-L of's logical framework, ELF employs the so-called variable convention:
Variables of object languages are identi ed with the variables in the logical framework.
T T : A Framework for De ning Type Theories
A typed calculus can only be a framework for a certain collection of typed calculi 2 . A well-known example is that in ELF, we are not able to code up relevant logic. Moving to a stronger type system is not necessarily a good idea. As far as logical frameworks are concerned, the priority should always be with simplicity and good meta-theoretical properties. It should be emphasized that TT is not meant to be a stronger logical framework. It is a manifestation of our view that a logical framework is a setting for de ning frame languages.
As long as one's logical framework is a typed calculus, what one can code up in his framework are some other typed calculi; but that is all. Some logics can be faithfully represented in such a framework because they have type theoretical formulations. Some other logics can be mimicked in the framework because some aspects of them can be captured type theoretically and these aspects are considered to be important. It is for this reason that we think of TT as a framework for de ning type theories.
The language TT is designed with these goals in mind:
It should unify ELF and Martin-L of's logical framework. It should simplify model theoretical investigations. It should have a built-in mechanism that formalizes processes to de ne internally codable (de nable) typed calculi.
There are several design decisions one has to make. Let's mention two of them:
We decided that TT should have nite product types. We decided that TT should be an explicit language.
Both decisions are in line with the second goal mentioned above. As for pragmatics, we adopt the well-established variable convention and the well-behaved equality convention.
In true type theoretical spirit, TT is an extension of Martin-L of's logical framework. The additional features are product types and universe declaration 3 . The universe declaration is the best way of getting rid of higher order operators like those in ELF while retaining all the expressive power. The product types are a compromise between having -types, which is troublesome, and having only -types, which sometimes does not produce good enough encodings (the problem is even more serious when we have universe declaration).
For instance, in ELF the plus operator + : N ! N ! N has a drawback: +(n) usually does not correspond to anything in object language. In TT we can declare + to be of type N N !N. The problem now disappears.
TT has the following assertions:
Uni| An equational context is just a nite list of de nitional equations. A careful reader must have noticed that by eliminating the higher order structure in ELF we have collapsed rules about valid families and those about valid objects into one group.
There are at least three questions concerned with TT :
1. Is the sublanguage LF con uent and strongly normalizing? 2. How do we carry out meta-theoretical investigations into a typed calculus formulated in TT ? 3. What is the proper notion of semantics of TT ?
The answer to 1 is believed to be yes. But so far its combinatorial complexity has defeated all attempts to prove it. The problem is that the proof of subject reduction and that of Church-Rosser property are heavily interwined. No trick has been invented to break the cycle.
Question 2 is harder. It can not be tackled before the proof theory of TT has been fully understood. This problem is closely related to that of compositional understanding of type theory|an issue that has not yet been properly addressed. This paper attempts to give an answer to question 3.
Formulating Object Languages
Some encodings given in this section may look more mathematical than proof-theoretical. We have tailored the encodings in such a way as to make the subsequent discussions easier. The reader is encouraged to compare examples 5.1 and 5.3 to those given in sections 4.1 and 4.2. In sequel, we often use subscript for application. For instance, app ; stands for app( )( ). We will not bother to di erentiate the universe declaration and signature notationally in the following examples.
Before giving the actual encodings, it is perhaps helpful to explain how ELF, a higher order language, is modelled by TT ` ; x : t U ( )`v(?) = x] E will stand for this encoding. We have not bothered to spell out the encoding for the constants as it is obvious how it can be done. The same remark also applies to the following examples.
Example 5.2 Again x a higher order polymorphic -calculus with a nite number of constants. To formulate the language in TT , one must have an operator that transforms higher order functionals to types. So in addition to the encoding for the simply typed -calculus, we need to add constants and equations that deal with kinds and constructors. 6 Small Categories in TT How do we code up an object language? Since the term model of TT is a bration, we can rephrase the question as this: how do we say \coding-up" in the language of brations? Our view, which is motivated by the example given in section 3, is that a coding-up process amounts to de ning an internal category. It follows that in TT there should be a routine way of constructing internal categories. It is the purpose of this section to show that TT has a built-in mechanism for de ning internal categories.
Let E be an encoding in TT . We can build a term model ( TT ; E) from the constants in the universe declaration and the signature of E using the equational contexts in E. It is common knowledge that the term model forms a bration ( TT ; E) : T ?! C. C is the category of contexts and contexts realizations. Here a context realization r : ? ?! x 1 : A 1 ; : : : ; x n : A n ] is a tuple (( (a 1 ; a 2 ); : : :; a n?1 ); a n ) such that ?`a 1 : A 1 ?`a 2 : A 2 a 1 =x 1 ] . . .
?`a n : A n a 1 =x 1 ; : : :; a n?1 =x n?1 ]:
The objects of T are types; for instance ?`A is an object in T ( One of the immediate questions one has to address in formulating an object language in any logical framework is how to treat the variables in an encoding of the object language. In both Martin-L of's logical framework and ELF, as well as in TT , those variables are identi ed with the variables in the frameworks. There doesn't seem to be any other way. But how do we justify it? Even if we believe that the question is not entirely relevant, we should however at least face these two questions: (i) what is the model theoretical implication of the variable convention? and (ii) is our logical framework good with respect to the answer we give to (i)?
Suppose E is an encoding of L in TT and U is a universe declared in E. Suppose further that E constitutes an internal category of C, the base category of ( TT ; E). If ?` ; a : U, then a`variable' of a is an indeterminant of an object in the bre ?; U]. If we are to identify a variable in ?; U] with a variable in TT , then ?; U] should be a full subcategory of ( TT ; E) ?1 (?). We therefore conclude that the categorical counterpart of the variable convention is this: if an object language is represented by a small category in C, then it is an internal full subcategory. This means that there is a full and faithful cartesian functor H as shown in the diagram below.
So to some extent the variable convention corresponds to internal codability. Type theoretically, this phenomenon can be interpreted as saying that the variable convention (and the equality convention) forces a kind of conservative extensionality relation between E and TT .
The result in section 6 can now be interpreted as saying that in TT the universe declaration mechanism conforms to the variable convention.
Structures of Universes
The internal categories discussed in section 6 are the backbones. When de ning a typed calculus in TT , we force those internal categories to have speci c structures. Let's look at the rst two examples given in section 5.
Lemma 8.1 The equations in Th simply says that the following diagrams are pullbacks in the bre category of the bration ( TT ; E ), where is for ) (or^) and _ is ! (or ); ! is ?` x:A:? : A!1 for appropriate ? and A; m is w:t U (1)!t U (2):abs(1)(2)w when is ); it is w:t U (1) t U (2):pair(1)(2)w when is^. The proofs for the other cases are similar.
The categorical implication of lemma 8.1 is obvious once we notice the following facts: (i) U is the internal category induced by (U`t U (1))
(1 U ;!)
?! (U`1); (ii) both`t U ( ) and`1 are terminal object; (iii) U 2`1 is the product of U`1 and U`1; (iv) (U 2`t U (i))
(1 U 2 ;!)
?! (U 2`1 ) is the pulling-back of (U`t U (1)) (1 U ;!)
?! (U`1) along the projection (U 2`1 ) i ?!(U`1) and (v) U 2`t U (1) t U (2) (or U 2`t U (1)!t U (2)) is the product (or exponential) over U 2 . Transport these results over to C using lemma 6.2, we conclude that the internal full subcategory _ U has explicit cartesian closed structures.
In the case of E PL , this property holds for both U and K. In addition we have Lemma 8.2 In the encoding E PL of higher order -calculus, the following is a pullback in the category T PL for any` ; : K. Again it is easy to see that (i) t K ( ) ! U`1 is the exponential of t K ( )`1 and U`1; (ii) (t K ( ) ! U; t K`tU (1(2)))
obtained by applying the right adjoint to (t K ( )!U; t K`tU (1(2)))
). In summary, lemma 8.2 says that the internal category _ U has explicit products over types lifted from a`kind'.
We can generalize what is embodied in the above examples: If a collection of certain entities in an object language is represented by a universe in TT , then to code up the operators associated with the collection is to equip the internal full subcategory, induced by the universe, with explicit categorical structures.
Syntactic Adequacy and Internal De nability
This section reveals the close tie between syntactic adequacy, a linguistic notion, and internal de nability, a semantic notion. This is done by examining the encodings de ned in section 5. We should point out that in order to demonstrate the relationship, we need not know if the encodings are syntactically adequate, nor do we have to know whether TT has good proof theoretical properties or not.
Syntactic and Closed Term Models
In this section there are two kinds of models we are interested in: the closed term models and the syntactic term models. In the former we consider only closed terms whereas in the latter we consider terms with free variables. For instance the closed term model of a simply typed -calculus is a cartesian closed category; on the other hand the syntactic term model of the same calculus is a bration L : T ?!C . Here C is the category of contexts and their realizations; a morphism over ? 2 C is an equivalence class of terms ?`f : A!B.
In most semantic investigations of non-dependent typed calculi we focus on closed term models. In the case of logical frameworks however syntactic term models are more relevant. This is because encodings in a logical framework deals not only with closed terms but also with terms with free variables. This is manifested in the fact that syntactic adequacy theorems are statements about sequents instead of closed terms.
In the case of dependent typed calculi however we always talk about syntactic term models.
Syntactic Adequacy
The encoding E provides us with a translation from a type A in the simply typedcalculus to a closed termÂ of type U in TT and from a judgement x 1 : A 1 ; : : :; x n : A n`t : A (1) in the simply typed -calculus to a judgement The correctness of the encoding is given by the so-called syntactic adequacy theorem, which says that 1. there is a bijective correspondence between the types in the simply typed -calculus and judgements of the form` ; Â : U in TT ; 2. there is a bijection between the judgements of the form (1) and the judgements of the form (2); strictly speaking,t should be an equivalence class, where the equivalence relation is induced by the -equality of TT excluding the de nitional equations in Th ; the same remark applies toÂ in the above case. . Finally observe that (a) the composition I; f`1g is an embedding and (b) the right square in the above diagram is a pullback. For the proof of (b), one only has to notice that the proof of proposition 6.3 is not a ected if new de nitional equalities are added. Proof : (i) By proposition 9.1, both L K PL and L T PL are internally de nable in ( TT ; E PL ). The general phenomenon seem to be this: If the encoding E L of a typed calculus L in TT is syntactically adequate then, in a canonical way (determined by the translation of L into E L ) L is internally de nable in ( TT ; E L ) (or, waving hand, L J TT ). In other words, a faithful encoding of L de nes a frame language such that L is an internal typed calculus de nable in the frame language via the encoding of L.
So to formulate an object language in TT is to identify a frame language which contains somehow an internal version of the represented language. The richer the object language, the richer the frame calculus. A correct identi cation of the frame language involves the build-up of an internal de nability relationship between the object language and the frame language.
The Notion of Models
We now turn our attention to semantics. There are two levels of semantics. The model theory of TT The proper model theory of logical frameworks is about the meanings of encodings and how to relate the model theory of an object language to that of a framework. It is this aspect of semantics we have been trying to understand. Suppose L is a typed calculus and E = ( ; ; Th) is an encoding of L in TT . There are two questions one can ask:
11 Conclusion and Related Work This paper attempts to give a model theoretical account of logical frameworks. We argue that the real issues in the semantics of logical frameworks are about the meanings of encodings and how they are related to the model theories of the object languages. We propose a logical framework that is well-suited to model theoretical analysis. Examples are given to show how syntactic conditions force term models to possess certain categorical properties. One important point taken in this paper is that a logical framework is a setting for de ning frame languages. According to this view, to code up an object language is to search for a frame language within which the object language is internally de nable. In the following table, the right column contains the semantic counterparts of the corresponding syntactic notions in the left column. proof theoretical notion model theoretical notion universes generic objects encodings of object calculi internal categories variable convention internal codability constants other than universes explicit structures on internal categories syntactic adequacy internal de nability By characterizing the categorical properties of TT and some encodings within it, we hope we have pointed out a sensible way of semantic investigations. It is our personal opinion that the general ideas expressed in this paper are helpful when one designs a logical framework or tries to code up an object language.
It seems that the categorical explanations make perfect sense when the object calculi are constructive. For a non-constructive language L, say Church's simple type theory, what we code up in a logical framework is the`image' of L in a`constructive mirror'. The point is that a demonstration of \something is a proof" is always constructive. It is this aspect of L that is captured in an encoding. So in this case, the categorical properties are characterizations of this`image'.
The development in Pow92] is at a more abstract level. There the author seeks a categorical setting within which semantical constructions of typed calculi can be carried out. There are two issues: one is to search for a semantic framework; the other is to study type theory semantically within the framework. The dichotomy corresponds to the one we advocate in this paper. The di erence is that we concentrate on a particular typed calculus and its semantic description. Our approach emphasizes the importance of internal categories in semantics of logical frameworks.
The language ELF + investigated in Gar92] is a re ned version of ELF. In addition to the kind Type, ELF + introduces two new kinds: Judge and Sort. The basic idea is that in an encoding of an object language, the basic judgements should be coded by inhabitants of Judge whereas sorts correspond to objects of Sort. The purpose is to achieve a close correspondence between a language and its representation in ELF + . We can modify TT along this line. For instance the universe declarations can be broken into two parts: one contains universes that encode judgements; the other consists of universes which represent sorts.
Gar92] contains an observation similar to that in section 9.3. Because of the presence of Judge and Sort, the author is able to prove that adequate encodings of a class of logics are essentially the same as the logics themselves when both are viewed as indexed categories. This`isomorphism' phenomenon is implicit in our de nition of internal de nability. The nice thing about our approach is that it brings out the internal categorical aspects of this phenomenon.
